BY GRIGOR HAKOBYAN

Background

As 2009 comes to a close, Azerbaijani war rhetoric does not seem to abate. Mr. Aliyev uses every public opportunity to threaten Armenia and the Armenians of Artsakh with resumption of full scale hostilities in the region.

To substantiate his claims the Azerbaijani president continues to pressure his parliament into vast increases of budget allocations to the Azerbaijani war machine and encourages widespread acquisitions of offensive weapons, military equipment and munitions from every country in the world willing to sell their weapons to them.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan continues to hold numerically the largest army in the region despite the fact that active confrontations with the Armenian side over Artsakh have predominately ended nearly 16 years ago.

Despite the fact that billions of dollars in revenues are flowing into state coffers from international operation of oil and gas fields the vast numbers of Azerbaijani people are barely making their ends meet and live in continuous poverty and neglect.

Considering that war can only bring destructions, death and suffering to vast majority of its people, the Azerbaijani leadership doesn’t shy away from making public declarations about their intent to start one in the region.

So the question arises whether the Azerbaijani government could be really trusted in securing a lasting peace with Armenia and what could explain their eagerness to resume hostilities in Artsakh.

Analysis

The Azerbaijani war rhetoric can be explained by a number of factors that will eventually contribute to its decline and the coming collapse of the ruling regime in Baku.

There is a high likelihood that the collapse of the regime in Baku will be accompanied by a civil war within the country that will put against each other the majority of Azerbaijani people who are disenchanted and repulsed by the corruption in the country. They feel the same about the oppressive monarchial rule of a tyrannical dynasty for the last 16 years and the small minority of people who have been benefiting from the inglorious corruption reigning the county and the oppressive regime that fuels it.

First of all, the continued decline of Azerbaijani’s economy that began in 2008 as a result of a lower demand for its oil and gas didn’t yet finish its free fall. Careful analysis of Azerbaijani’s economic indicators will reveal a shrinking GDP and slowing economic growth.

Specifically, in 2006 Azerbaijan’s GDP stood at 26.4 percent, in 2007 it rose to 34.5 percent and in 2008 it declined to 23.4 percent. While in 2009, it stood at 10.8 percent. With very little indication for the final end of economic recession throughout the world and the much anticipated economic rebound, Azerbaijan’s oil sector will not be able to produce any more revenues than what it has generated before.

Azerbaijan’s economic growth is set to decline even further by bottoming out in 2012, when the production of oil in the country will peak and become no longer attractive to foreign investments and further development.

With no serious projections of a growing demand for its oil in 2010 and the failure of the Azerbaijani government to diversify its economy, the gap between those who have and those who have not in Azerbaijan will continue to accelerate causing mass outrage and discontent among the populace. As such public protests on the streets of Baku and throughout the Azerbaijan are more than likely to increase in their frequency and intensity.

Second of all, the massive corruption in the country is eroding the public trust into its public institutions of power. According to a 2009 Transparency International report, 46 percent of respondents in Azerbaijan have reported to having bribed various authorities as part of their daily affairs. In comparison only 43 percent did so in Armenia, 2 percent in Georgia and 31 percent in Russia. Furthermore, only 14 percent of Azerbaijani respondents have assessed the actions of their government in fighting corruption as effective in comparison to 38 percent in Armenia, 57 percent in Georgia and 22 percent in Russia.

Such growing public distrust of their authorities opens room for emergence of a parallel regime in the likeness of the Taliban that is slowly shimmering in the south of Azerbaijan. In the coming years a number of religious leaders advocating their own form of pure Islam and social justice will emerge that countries like Iran or Saudi Arabia will be very eager to influence and bring to power. In order to consolidate his base among the common populace and save their allegiance from shifting over to another center of traditional authority, the Islam, Mr. Aliyev’s leadership is tirelessly portraying Armenia as the outside threat to the Azerbaijani state and its people.

Conclusion

The eagerness of Azerbaijan’s leadership to resolve this issue by means of military force does nothing else but to undermine the stability in the region and further show the unconstructive approach taken by the Azerbaijani authorities toward international efforts to resolve this conflict through peaceful means.

Furthermore, the recent remarks by various Azerbaijani government officials in the media about reclaiming the province of Zangezur from Armenia proper indicates that they have chosen the route of escalation that, if implemented, will not only harm the countries which are directly involved in this conflict, but also jeopardize the international security and internal stability of all the neighboring states as well.

It is more than apparent that any efforts to resolve this conflict by forcing Artsakh to remain as part of Azerbaijan or pressure Armenia to make unilateral concessions on this matter are more than futile — they are ill conceived, unrealistic and extremely dangerous. Such irresponsible actions will put in jeopardy not only the security of every person in the region but also undermine the greater security architecture of the Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia.

Azerbaijan must be made to understand that retaking Artsakh by force is not an option. Moreover, contemplating to put their hands on any portion of Armenia proper will spell the end of the Azerbaijani state as it stands right now.

Grigor Hakobyan is a special contributor to Yerevan Report. He is an independent political analyst residing in Los Angeles and the founder of Caucasus Watch Public Research Initiative. He is a freelance writer for the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of John Hopkins University. He has interned at the US House of Representatives where he engaged in research of ethnic conflicts and terrorism in Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. He also interned  at the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies where he researched international terrorism networks operating in the Caucasus and Central Asia and prepared congressional briefings for the Director of ICTS on WMDs. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Arizona State University.